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emissaries in July 1927.8 Hornyák does 
not add any new information on this clan-
destine military co-operation. Perhaps 
Hungarian records have not survived, if 
they existed at all.
There are some minor deficiencies 
that should also be pointed out. Serbian 
Colonel who negotiated armistice with 
the Hungarian delegation in early No-
vember 1918 was Danilo, and not Dan-
iel, Kalafatović (p. 285, n. 5). The Politika 
and Tribuna were government-controlled 
newspapers and not parties (pp. 104 and 
326, n. 16 respectively). VMRO stands 
for the Internal Macedonian Revolution-
ary Organisation and not Macedonian 
Liberation Organisation (p. 146). Miles 
Lampson was Head of the Central De-
partment of the British Foreign Office, 
not a “deputy foreign minister” or an “un-
8 Vera Jelinek, “The Hungarian Factor in 
Italian Foreign Policy, 1918–1927” (unpub-
lished PhD thesis, New York University, 
1977), pp. 319–320.
dersecretary of state” (pp. 220 and 240 
respectively).
In conclusion, Hornyák has pro-
duced the most comprehensive study on 
the subject of Yugo-Hungarian relations 
in the first decade after the Great War 
which will serve as a sound foundation for 
international historians interested in the 
Danube region. It is rather unfortunate 
that his diligent work is seriously marred 
by poor English translation which often 
makes it difficult to follow the text.9 There 
are also a number of typographic errors 
(for instance, Vešnić instead of Vesnić). 
The worst example of an inadequate 
proof-reading is no doubt the disparity in 
a few chapters between the actual num-
ber of references in the main body of texts 
and the endnotes listed.
9 Originally published as Magyar-jugoszláv 
diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1918–1927 (Forum, 
2004).
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Reviewed by Dragan Bakić*
The first book forms part of the Makers 
of the Modern World: The Peace Conferences 
of 1919–23 and Their Aftermath series 
edited by Professor Alan Sharp, which 
brings new insights into the proceedings 
and legacy of the Paris Peace Conference 
through biographies of the most promi-
nent participants. Dejan Djokić has con-
tributed parallel biographies of two lead-
ing members of the Yugoslav delegation, 
Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić. The for-
mer was a long-serving Prime Minister of 
Serbia and the latter a distinguished Croat 
politician who vigorously campaigned for 
a Yugoslav union during the First World 
War as the head of the London-based 
Yugoslav committee, a body composed of 
Croat, Serb and Slovene exiles from the 
Habsburg Monarchy. In drawing atten-
tion to differences between the two men, 
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Djokić has also provided a useful addition 
to the literature on the creation of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(renamed Yugoslavia in 1929). His con-
tribution lies in interpretation rather than 
in unearthing any new information. In-
deed, his work is almost exclusively based 
on the existing literature and, in particu-
lar, draws heavily on the classic studies of 
Lederer and Mitrović.1 This is all the more 
understandable as the author has catered 
for non-academic audiences and not just 
experts. The book is easily read thanks to 
Djokić’s concise but clear elucidation of 
arguments.  
Part I of the book overviews the his-
tory of Yugoslav lands, Serbia and Croatia 
in particular, prior to 1914, the origins of 
the Yugoslav idea and the political paths 
of Pašić and Trumbić. It is a pity that their 
views on a Yugoslav union before and dur-
ing the war are not explored more fully, 
but Djokić nevertheless seems to suggest 
that, in the end, both men were somewhat 
overwhelmed by the dynamics of events. 
Pašić vacillated between a Yugoslavia and 
a Greater Serbia, “caught between the 
19th-century ideals of a Serbian struggle 
for liberation and unification and the re-
ality of the new, Yugoslav century” (p. 24). 
However, he might have easily not seen 
these two options as alternatives to be 
chosen from, as he had long perceived the 
bickering between Serbs and Croats as 
being over imposing leadership and tra-
dition “during the unification of Serbo-
Croats” (the author gives Pašić’s quote on 
p. 20). As for Trumbić, Djokić concludes 
that he could see “no alternative to Yu-
goslavia” as Croatia alone, or rather what 
would be left of her, would found herself 
in a precarious position at the end of the 
1 Ivo Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace 
Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking (Yale 
University Press, 1963); Andrej Mitrović, 
Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919–1920 
(Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1969).
war in which she had fought on the side 
of the defeated (p. 52).
Part II deals with the activities of the 
Yugoslav delegates in Paris. The delega-
tion was headed by 74-years old Pašić who 
was not Prime Minister at the time due to 
King Alexander’s veto. In fact, it was the 
only major delegation not led by a prime 
minister or a president, which, along with 
the poor system of communication with 
the government in Belgrade, seriously 
hindered the capacity of the delegation 
to make important decisions on the spot. 
Having been appointed Foreign Minister, 
and also being a leading Croat, Trumbić 
was the second most important figure. Be-
sides Serbs and Croats, the delegation, or 
rather the Political Section of it, included 
Slovene representatives so as to reflect the 
composition of the Kingdom of Serbs, Cro-
ats and Slovenes founded on 1 December 
1918 on the premise that they constituted 
a single – though three-named – South 
Slav nation. The newly-formed state was, 
however, not recognised by the Principal 
Allies and the Yugoslav delegation was 
officially regarded as that of the Kingdom 
of Serbia. Consequently, the foremost task 
facing the delegates was to secure the rec-
ognition of their country and also to con-
tend with the competing territorial claims 
of six out of seven neighbouring countries, 
allies and enemies alike. The main oppo-
nent of Yugoslavia was allied Italy which 
coveted the Slovene- and Croat-populated 
provinces of Istria and Dalmatia which 
had been promised to her under the terms 
of the secret Treaty of London in 1915 in 
exchange for her entry into war. As sig-
natories of that treaty, Britain and France 
were bound to support Italian claims on 
the Yugoslav territories – in what is known 
as the Adriatic question – whereas the 
American President, Woodrow Wilson, 
the champion of the right to national self-
determination, sided with the Yugoslavs. 
The peacemakers were not capable of set-
tling this problem, which even caused the 
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Italian delegation’s temporary withdrawal 
from Paris. It was finally settled directly by 
the two rivals concluding the Treaty of Ra-
pallo in November 1920.
Tensions between Pašić and Trumbić 
put additional strain on the work of the 
delegation. The main difficulty stemmed 
from their different approaches to advo-
cating the Yugoslav cause before the Al-
lies. Trumbić insisted that the Yugoslavs 
should strictly adhere to national self-de-
termination as the basis of their territorial 
demands in keeping with the Wilsonian 
doctrine. Always an archrealist, Pašić was 
not too impressed with professions of a 
new era in international relations, nor did 
he believe that the world had just liqui-
dated “the war to end all wars”. In his 
view, the nationality principle should be 
fully exploited in Dalmatia and the Banat 
(the region eventually divided with Ro-
mania), where it clearly justified Yugoslav 
claims, but in other cases he was prepared 
to advance geostrategic reasons in order 
to obtain rectification of borders in Yu-
goslavia’s favour. Djokić goes so far as to 
state that differences between Pašić and 
Trumbić emerged, at least partly, due to 
their conflicting ideologies, “the national-
ity principle vs Realpolitik” (p. 151). This 
appears to be a simplification of what in 
reality hardly was a clear-cut line of di-
vision. Pašić was mainly concerned with 
territorial acquisitions that would directly 
benefit pre-war Serbia and secure strate-
gically more viable borders regardless of 
the nationality principle and of whether 
that would be at the expense of a former 
ally or enemy. In that, he was a true prac-
titioner of Realpolitik. Trumbić’s exclusive 
motivation by the Wilsonian principles is 
highly doubtful, however. He did expound 
the nationality principle with a view to 
settling the Adriatic question, but, in do-
ing so, he was, just like Pašić, led by more 
narrow “tribal” interests – border delinea-
tion with Italy was an exclusively Croat 
affair. A native of Split, the largest town 
in Dalmatia, Trumbić feared, along with 
another resident of Split and Croat del-
egate, Josip Smodlaka, that Pašić’s strate-
gic requirements concerning Bulgarian or 
Hungarian border might undermine the 
Yugoslav superior moral position in the 
Adriatic and lend justification to exces-
sive Italian claims. Conveniently for him, 
Trumbić could defend all Croat interests 
under the popular banner of national self-
determination. After all, it was hardly 
surprising that Serb, Croat and Slovene 
delegates alike were more willing to make 
concessions when such losses were to be 
suffered by a “tribe” other than their own. 
On the other hand, Djokić rightly argues 
that differences between them should not 
be overstated since “they maintained a re-
markable show of unity when communi-
cating with other delegations” (p. 67). 
The author briefly recounts the 
claims, expectations, and results of the 
Yugoslav delegation, dealing separately 
with each contested border, as well as the 
Yugoslav attitude towards war crimes and 
war guilt. The Treaty of Versailles did not 
concern the territorial scope of the new 
state which did not border on Germany, 
but the delegation’s signature in the form 
of “Serbie-Croatie-Slavonie [sic]” consti-
tuted a de facto recognition of the Yugo-
slav Kingdom. Territorial disputes – with 
the noted exception of the Adriatic ques-
tion – were settled by the provisions of 
the (Austrian) Treaty of St. Germaine, 
the (Bulgarian) Treaty of Neuilly and the 
(Hungarian) Treaty of Trianon. Overall, 
the Yugoslavs could claim to have had 
much success under difficult circum-
stances. Djokić’s account of these events 
makes an excellent reading but contains 
two minor distortions. When the Allies 
asked Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs to 
join Romanians in military intervention 
against the Bolshevik regime of Béla Kun 
in Hungary, the latter did not jump at “an 
opportunity to secure their claims in the 
north”. Pašić may have been in that frame 
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of mind, unlike Trumbić, but it was the 
government in Belgrade that made deci-
sions and it was unenthusiastic about any 
such venture (pp. 137–138). Discussing 
Yugoslavia’s internal instability, Djokić 
speaks of “alienation among many Mon-
tenegrins and Croats because of the way 
Yugoslavia had been united” (p. 150). This 
implies the similarity in the causes and 
levels of dissatisfaction in Montenegro 
and Croatia while, in fact, any such com-
parison is wide of the mark. 
Part III looks at the legacy of the Peace 
Conference as seen from the Yugoslav 
experience. It is noted that differences 
between Pašić and Trumbić were “symp-
tomatic of the wider Serb-Croat dynamics 
in Yugoslavia”. In this connection, Djokić 
seems to overemphasise “their mutually 
competing visions of a united Yugoslavia” 
(p. 151); this difference was very real and 
had manifested itself during the war, but 
it was not on the agenda of the conference 
and thus caused no dissent among the del-
egates. Pašić’s and Trumbić’s careers after 
the conference, however, reflected the rift 
between Serbs and Croats centred on the 
dilemma of centralism versus decentra-
lised state. Despite his advanced age, Pašić 
remained a pivotal figure in Yugoslavia’s 
political life until his death in late 1926, 
whereas Trumbić soon resigned as For-
eign Minister and became a staunch op-
ponent of centralism and even abandoned 
his earlier Yugoslavism, but he never again 
played an as important role as at the time 
of the conference. Finally, the author draws 
an interesting parallel between the Ver-
sailles settlement and the settlement of the 
South Slav question which took the form 
of the Yugoslav state. He does away with 
the often repeated blunder of labelling Yu-
goslavia a Versailles creation. Indeed, the 
facts speak for themselves: Yugoslavia was 
formed prior to the gathering in Paris and 
the Peace Conference can be said at most 
to have sanctioned its existence (pp. 63–64, 
163–164). As for the claim that Yugosla-
via was an artificial state bound to disin-
tegrate, as it eventually did in the 1990s, 
Djokić soundly dismisses it as a product of 
daily politics rather than historical analysis. 
He points out that Yugoslavia’s durability 
throughout most of the violent twentieth 
century is a proof that it was not a miscar-
riage from the start. His hint at the pos-
sibility that “it may yet return one day in 
another guise within the EU framework” 
(p. 166), on the other hand, is, to this re-
viewer’s mind, unrealistic altogether. It 
would certainly be interesting to find out 
what the author’s views are as to the con-
nection between the break-up of Yugosla-
via and the at least partial reconfiguration 
of the Versailles settlement that took place 
at the end of the twentieth century. He 
presumably remains silent on this mat-
ter in keeping with his refutation of the 
notion that Yugoslavia was a Versailles 
creation. Moreover, his sympathy for Yu-
goslavia, although not explicitly stated, is 
apparent while he describes the terms of 
the Versailles Treaty as “infamously harsh” 
(p. 131). In doing so, he comes down on 
the side of those who continue to decry the 
peace settlement of 1919 as the source of 
all ills that were to follow and culminate in 
the Second World War despite the nearly 
unanimous view of international historians 
offering a much more balanced account.2
In conclusion, Djokić has provided 
a very readable, useful and thought-pro-
voking work for those interested not just 
in the Yugoslav delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference but also in the lives of 
Pašić and Trumbić, and, more widely, in 
the fate of Yugoslavia. 
Djokić’s other book, his expanded 
doctoral dissertation (University College 
2 For the most recent and excellent discus-
sion see Sally Marks, “Mistakes and Myths: 
The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles 
Treaty, 1918–1921”, Journal of Modern His-
tory 85:3 (September 2013), 632–659.
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of London, 2004), closely looks at the 
tortuous attempts to find a Serb-Croat 
compromise on the administrative form 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (Yugoslavia) throughout its in-
terwar existence. Choosing a quest for 
an agreement rather than reasons behind 
the conflict as a central topic is reveal-
ing of the author’s argument. He claims 
that the internal instability of Yugosla-
via cannot and should not be reduced to 
confrontation between Serbs and Croats; 
in doing so, he challenges the ossified as-
sumption from Banac’s classic study that 
the national ideologues of the two largest 
Yugoslav nations grew so irreconcilable 
in the early and formative years that the 
Kingdom established on the basis of the 
1921 Vidovdan Constitution was in fact 
still-born.3 According to Djokić, there 
were many developments in political 
contest that cut across the purely ethnic 
divide and therefore required a differ-
ent paradigm through which to be scru-
tinised. Moreover, he considers “political 
events as they developed after the unifica-
tion as equally if not more important for 
an understanding of the period” (p. 10). 
His great contribution is in that he offers 
us a fresh perspective which might yield 
interesting findings.
It must be said though that the sub-
titles are unsuitable and misleading. This 
book is certainly not comprehensive 
enough to be considered “a history of in-
terwar Yugoslavia”. Perhaps, the author is 
not to be solely blamed for such an error 
at a time when catchy titles – and sub-
titles, for that matter – are susceptible to 
certain distortions in order to please pub-
lishers and secure the best possible sale. Be 
that as it may, Djokić changed the subtitle 
for the Serbian edition to meet the case: 
it reads “Serb-Croat Question in Inter-
3 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugo-
slavia: origins, history, politics (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1988).
war Yugoslavia”.4 To his credit, the book 
rests on extensive research. In addition to 
the relevant archives located in Belgrade 
and Zagreb, this study draws on collec-
tions held in the Bakhmeteff Archive of 
Russian and East European Culture at 
the Columbia University and the Hoover 
Institution Archives at the Stanford Uni-
versity, which are of crucial importance 
but have so far been largely neglected by 
historians. The only other collections that 
could have been beneficially consulted are 
Hinko Krizman Papers in the Archives 
of Yugoslavia and Svetozar Pribićević 
Papers deposited at the Bakhmeteff Ar-
chive – the two were the most prominent 
members of the Independent Democratic 
Party which formed a coalition with the 
Croatian Peasant Party (CPP) in 1927 
known as the Peasant Democratic Coali-
tion. The book is very well-written and ac-
cessible not just to specialists, but also to 
wider audiences. Djokić’s main argument, 
however, can only be partially sustained. 
He stands his ground in demonstrating 
that the dynamics of political struggle, 
including that between Serbs and Croats, 
became even livelier post-1921 by review-
ing its ups and downs and the involve-
ment of many actors. In that context, it is 
rather intriguing to ponder how a tragic 
event, or even a coincidence, could have 
decisively shaped the course of events. 
For example, the murder of Stjepan Radić 
and two other members of the Croatian 
Peasant Party by a Serb fellow deputy in 
the National Assembly in June 1928 had 
reversed the situation created by the 1925 
agreement between the Croat leader and 
Prime Minister Pašić. The author won-
ders, and this reviewer as well, “what the 
effect on Serb-Croat relations it would 
have been if Pribićević, a Serb [who was 
also shot at], had been murdered too” (p. 
4 Dejan Djokić, Nedostižni kompromis: srp-
sko-hrvatsko pitanje u medjuratnoj Jugoslaviji 
(Belgrade: Reč, 2010).
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67, fn. 92). Or perhaps murdered instead 
of Radić? On the other hand, Djokić 
greatly overstates his case concerning the 
alleged over-pronounced significance of 
Serb-Croat rivalry. He is at pains to sup-
port his claim when discussing both ma-
jor developments and certain details, but 
almost invariably fails to do so. This will 
be discussed in more detail below.
The first two chapters, in Djokić’s 
words, set the scene for an in-depth ex-
ploration that is to come. The major events 
of the First World War are reviewed to 
show how the unification of Yugosla-
via took place on 1 December 1918. In 
doing so, Djokić also debunks the oft-
repeated claims which have reflected po-
litical needs in Serbia and Croatia since 
the turbulent 1990s rather than historical 
analysis. The British proposal of the sum-
mer of 1915 that Serbia should cede her 
southern parts, i.e. Vardar Macedonia, to 
Bulgaria in exchange for the large tracts 
of the then Habsburg territories has been 
too simplistically interpreted as an offer 
of an extended (Greater) Serbia which 
the Pašić government rejected and opted 
for a Yugoslav state (pp. 16–17), a disas-
trous mistake in that interpretation with 
the benefit of hindsight. The Croatian 
Sabor (Diet) dissolved itself on 29 Octo-
ber 1918, more than a month before the 
creation of Yugoslavia, with the motiva-
tion that it was not needed as the State 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) was 
formed and historic Croatia ceased to 
exist (pp. 25–26) – this fact contradicts 
the myth of the continuity of Croatian 
statehood transferred into Yugoslavia. Of 
particular interest is the account of the 
deliberations of the November 1918 Ses-
sion of the National Council of the State 
of SCS, which disclosed a variety of opin-
ions among the Habsburg Yugoslavs as to 
the internal structure of a Yugoslav state. 
However, it was a foreign danger, namely 
the advancing of Italian troops in Dalma-
tia, that cut the Gordian knot and effected 
a prompt and unconditional unification 
with Serbia predicated on the notion that 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were the three 
tribes of a single Yugoslav nation.
The differences made apparent in 
the National Council carried on in the 
Provisional Parliament of the newly-es-
tablished Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia). 
Djokić stresses that the division into the 
supporters of the Democratic-Socialist 
Bloc and the Parliamentary Union did 
not run along ethnic lines. Yet, the two 
largest Serbian parties agreed in the after-
math of the November 1920 elections to 
promulgate the centralist Vidovdan Con-
stitution against the wishes of all other 
parties. Therefore, it does not seem plau-
sible to divorce the constitutional debate 
between centralists and autonomists from 
a Serb-Croat conflict, although the author 
admits that the former contest “gradu-
ally turned into” (p. 43) the latter. It has 
long been demonstrated that this clash 
stemmed from the opposing political tra-
ditions of the two nations: the Serbs had 
lived in a centralist unitary state prior to 
the Great War, whereas Croats had been 
used to complex state arrangements such 
as that of the 1868 Compromise (Na-
godba) with Hungarians.5 The centralist-
minded Croats were a tiny minority just 
as Stojan Protić could not gather much 
support for the autonomy of historical 
provinces on the Serbian side. “The vola-
tile twenties”, as Djokić aptly describes 
them, provide perhaps most evidence for 
his argument since this period witnessed 
Radić’s political alliances with three Serb 
leaders, Davidović, Pašić and Pribićević. 
The mercurial Croat leader recognised 
the state and the Kardjordjević dynasty 
and even spent some time as a Minister in 
5 SrdjaTrifković, “The First Yugoslavia and 
Origins of Croatian Separatism”, East Eu-
ropean Quarterly XXVI:3 (September 1992), 
345–370. 
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Pašić’s government. Following his death, 
however, the Serb-Croat confrontation 
became rather crystallised, much more 
that Djokić would have it. The dictator-
ship of King Alexander and the govern-
ment-sponsored “integral Yugoslavism” 
designed to erase all “tribal” identities and 
forge a single Yugoslav nation further ag-
gravated the Serb-Croat divide.  
All attempts to find a solution to the 
“Croat Question” within the framework 
of integral Yugoslavism failed dismally. 
After the assassination of King Alexander 
in Marseilles in October 1934 and the 5 
May 1935 elections which fully legiti-
mised Radić’s successor at the head of the 
CPP, Vlatko Maček, as the leader of the 
entire Croat people, it fell to the Regent, 
Prince Paul, and his new Premier Milan 
Stojadinović to seek a solution to internal 
disruptions. The latter two considerably 
relaxed the dictatorship and immediately 
showed good will – by releasing Maček 
from prison – and readiness to come to 
terms with Croats. They were not devoted 
to integral Yugoslavism as King Alexan-
der had been, but they were not willing 
to abrogate the octroyed Constitution of 
1931 or accept a federal solution either. 
Djokić recounts Maček’s parallel contacts 
with the regime and the Serbian opposi-
tion parties which formed an informal 
and rather loose coalition known as the 
United Opposition (UO, composed of 
Democrats, Agrarians and the faction of 
Radicals loyal to the party’s Main Com-
mittee). He attaches great importance to 
the formation of the Bloc of the National 
Agreement on 8 October 1937 compris-
ing the Peasant Democratic Coalition and 
the UO, and goes so far as to present it 
as “the Serb-Croat democratic opposition” 
(p. 272). In line with that, he presents a 
detailed account of Maček’s “triumphant” 
visit to Belgrade in August 1938 for the 
purpose of conferring with the leaders of 
the UO. However, both the democratic 
potential and the overall importance of 
the said Bloc are highly dubious. For the 
Serbian opposition, restoration of full civil 
liberties and political freedoms was in-
deed the chief objective; once achieved, it 
would create favourable conditions for a 
democratic solution to the Croat question. 
Maček and his party, on the other hand, 
were exclusively concerned with attaining 
broad autonomy for Croatia. They knew 
that the Crown alone could grant them 
concessions and guarantee any agreement, 
quite apart from Maček’s personal sym-
pathy and respect for Prince Paul. In ad-
dition, the Serbian political scene was so 
fragmented that there was no single po-
litical party or leader that could speak for 
the majority of Serbs. Under the circum-
stances, the Croats directed most of their 
energies to negotiations with Prince Paul 
and whoever enjoyed his confidence. Flir-
tation with the UO was rather a tactical 
move. It strengthened the CPP’s position 
towards the government – Stojadinović’s 
Radicals, Slovene Clericals and Bosnian 
Muslims gathered in the Yugoslav Radical 
Union. Maček flaunted the abolishment 
of the dictatorship as a popular slogan, but 
that was of no importance to him. In fact, 
a return to democracy might have been an 
obstacle to reaching an agreement with 
the Crown since he was aware of Prince 
Paul’s intense dislike for all the leaders of 
the UO. Maček was perfectly content to 
have an autonomous Croatia under the 
Karadjordjević dictatorship and that was 
exactly what happened in 1939. Djokić 
provides plenty of evidence for the CPP’s 
somewhat cynical attitude towards the UO 
(esp. pp. 162–163) and that is what makes 
his praise of the Bloc of the National 
Agreement surprising. Equally surprising 
is his statement that the Bloc “and even 
the Pašić-Radić pact of the mid-1920’s 
were political compromises arguably more 
deserving of the label ‘Serb-Croat’” than 
the 1939 Sporazum which gave life to an 
autonomous Croatia (p. 276).
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Stojadinović encouraged Maček to 
deepen his cooperation with the UO so 
that a two-party system could be estab-
lished pitting unitarists and federalists 
against each other – with Serbs and Cro-
ats, particularly the former, in both camps 
– but the Croat leader dismissed the 
proposal as detrimental to the Croatian 
cause. This may have led Djokić to claim 
that “unlike Maček, Stojadinović did not 
see divisions between the government and 
opposition as strictly ‘national’ (i.e. Serb-
Croat) but as ‘political’ (i.e. centralism vs. 
Federalism)” (pp. 149–150). The claim is 
not convincing: Stojadinović simply em-
ployed the tactics used by Pašić in the 
1920s trying to persuade the Croats to put 
an end to their boycott of political insti-
tutions and thus transform their national 
struggle into a regular political and parlia-
mentary contest – for that reason Maček 
rejected his suggestion, as mentioned 
above. Furthermore, Djokić entirely ne-
glects the international dimension to the 
Croat question and Stojadinović’s foreign 
policy in particular. By concluding the 
1937 pact with Italy and nurturing cor-
dial relations with Germany, Stojadinović 
made sure that no foreign help would be 
forthcoming to Maček or the terrorist 
Ustaša organisation. Admittedly, Maček 
remained intransigent but he could not 
use foreign support as a means of pres-
surising Belgrade into concessions. The 
same lack of appreciation for the decisive 
impact of the international situation on 
the Croat question in the late 1930s ac-
counts for Djokić’s claim that the fall of 
Stojadinović “should be understood pri-
marily in the context of the internal po-
litical debate on the future of Yugoslavia” 
(p. 174).6
6 Dušan Biber, “O padu Stojadinovićeve 
vlade”, Istorija 20. veka VII (Beograd, 1966), 
5–71, makes it clear that the reasons were 
much more complicated. 
A further instance of downplaying 
the essential importance of the Serb-
Croat rift is the author’s insistence on the 
fact that the coalitions which took part in 
the 1935 and 1938 elections, both gov-
ernmental and opposition, were not made 
on ethnic basis. That is no doubt true, but 
it proves little more than the pragmatism 
of Yugoslav politicians who were able to 
put aside all differences in order to over-
come technical difficulties of an electoral 
law and boost their chances of success. 
That is how, for example, a freakish alli-
ance between the CPP and the Yugoslav 
National Party, pledged to unitarism and 
integral Yugoslavism, came into being. 
It is revealing, however, that the opposi-
tion list headed by Maček failed to issue a 
joint election manifesto both in 1935 and 
1938 (pp. 185–186). On a much smaller 
scale, it is an exaggeration to conclude, 
from an anecdote which involved sending 
a cake to Maček in his prison cell, that 
“leading Serbian academics supported co-
operation between the Serbs and Croats” 
(p. 123) – though it is not said here that 
some of them did not. The same can be 
said of drawing far-reaching conclusions 
based on an incident in a Croatian vil-
lage (pp. 146–147). “The enmity between 
Stojadinović and Živković [Prime Minis-
ter during King Alexander’s dictatorship] 
matched and even overshadowed the one 
between the Prime Minister and Maček, 
providing yet another example of an in-
tra-ethnic, political conflict”, Djokić con-
cludes without much regard for the na-
ture of the relations between Stojadinović 
and the other two (p. 180). 
Dragiša Cvetković, Stojadinović’s 
successor as premier, continued talks with 
Maček acting as Prince Paul’s personal 
envoy. This time the pressure of the pre-
carious international situation loomed 
even larger, but the Croat leader was now 
in a position to sound Italy out – Ber-
lin turned down his overtures so as not 
to wound Italian susceptibilities. Djokić 
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seems to underrate what the British saw 
as Maček’s blackmailing tactics and the 
difficulties in which Prince Paul found 
himself. The deal was finally struck on 26 
August 1939: the ethnic-based Banovina 
of Croatia, unlike King Alexander’s ban-
ovinas, was formed the territorial scope 
of which exceeded that of the Habsburg 
historic or, for that matter, today’s Croa-
tia. Djokić describes the situation in the 
newly-created Croatian banovina marked 
by a number of violent incidents in which 
Serbs and pro-Yugoslav Croats were vic-
tims. Yet, he tries to argue that these con-
flicts were “in many aspects personal and 
ideological, not necessarily ‘ethnic’” (pp. 
217–218). Djokić focuses on the town of 
Split to prove his point and stresses how 
the local branch of the CPP split into a 
number of mutually hostile factions (pp. 
220–222) and the conflict arose as much 
among Croats as between Croats and 
Serbs. But from the evidence he quotes 
it is clear that these realignments among 
Croats were caused purely by hunger for 
power, not by any ideological reasons or 
different attitude towards local Serbs. 
Similarly, he argues that the demand of 
Serbs from the Croatian town of Vukovar 
to have their district transferred “to the 
jurisdiction of the Dunavska banovina” 
was some “local goal” (p. 242), although it 
was no doubt motivated by their wish to 
be excluded from the scope of Croatian 
banovina. 
The 1939 Sporazum did not settle 
down the heated atmosphere in Yugo-
slavia since it was incomplete. It marked 
the beginning of the federalisation of 
the country, but that process was never 
completed. Djokić provides an excellent 
overview of the political confusion that 
engulfed the Serbs who did not receive 
their own ethnic banovina – just like the 
Slovenes – which provoked the “Serbs, 
rally together” movement. The status of 
Bosnia was also an open question. The 
author seems to display certain dissatis-
faction with the 1939 agreement on ac-
count of its failure to bring about a return 
to democracy, but still maintains that it 
“marked a positive step toward finding a 
Serb-Croat compromise” (p. 268). It was 
the Axis aggression, and not domestic 
instability, that liquidated Yugoslavia in 
April 1941. Djokić briefly sketches these 
events but not without some highly con-
tentious assertions, such as his endorse-
ment of the 27 March military coup and 
Anthony Eden’s allegedly prophetic ad-
vice to Prince Paul, as well as his specula-
tion on what might have befallen Yugo-
slavia had she survived the war intact. 
Overall, Djokić has produced a thor-
oughly researched, well-written and 
somewhat contentious book which will 
be a mandatory reading for any student 
of Serb-Croat relations in the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. 
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